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Clark

Andrew Clark

F aIling through the
Cracks: Queer Theory,
Same-Sex Marriage,
Lawrence v Texas, and
Liminal Bodies
On November 4, 2008,
voters in California voted on
Proposition 8 and successfully
overturned
state-recognized
same-sex marriage. Before the
vote on November 4, both sid es
of the argument were concerned
with how marriage might be
redefined,
and
what
the
continuation or the end of samesex marriage would mean for
California, married couples (both
gay and straight), and the
institution of marriage itself.
The vote on Proposition 8
is just one in a long line of legal
battles that define and refine
same-sex relationships. Since the
Baehr v. Lewin decision in
Hawaii in 1993 and the passage of
DOMA in 1996, gay relationships,
and
more
specifically gay
marriage, have been at the fore of
political social thought. Looking
at the literature available on
same-sex relationships vis-a-vis
politics and the law, Lawrence v.
Texas is a major defining legal
decision and is often the focus of
law scholars, academic writers,
and queer theorists. Queer
theorists and the contemporary
gay rights movement both use
Lawrence to support their claims
about the institution of marriage
and its value to the queer
community. Queer readings of
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marriage question the regulatory and demarcating effects of state
sanctioned relationships, citing Lawrence as evidence of the state further
defining acceptable queer relationships.l As Nan Hunter explains, the
government will ironically be more (not less) involved in the examination
and propagation of properly queer relationships. 2 National gay rights
organizations cite Lawrence as a step in the direction of full equality.
Lawrence v. Texas decriminalized sodomy, thereby protecting same-sex
sex acts in the private sphere. For many national gay organizations, with
the achievement of privacy protection in hand, the next step is public
recognition of gay relationships and their value to society.
Both sides of the gay marriage debate miss two key elements in
their arguments. First, both frame same-sex marriage in an either/or
dichotomy. Either there is gay marriage, or there is traditional marriage.
While both sides are willing to examine the effects of marriage for either
gay or straight couples, neither side really looks at those liminal
relationships and bodies that occupy the liminal space produced by staterecognized marriage, regardless of configuration. Carroll Smith-Rosenberg
defines liminal bodies as those that occupy "the state of being between
categories and the power inherent in that process."3 Liminal bodies do not
neatly fall into a single category, but rather have the ability to slip in and
out of categorical spaces. This slippage allows liminal bodies to use the
current system to their advantage while simultaneously exposing the
cracks in that system through their occupation of liminal political and
cultural space.
Secondly, neither side examines how the institution of marriage is
both positively and negatively productive of bodies. Jasbir Puar argues
that Lawrence reflects the nationalist, regulatory, and racialized rhetoric
of Post-9/n politics,4 while Amy Brandzel highlights the function of
racialized citizenship in same-sex marriage. 5 Lawrence and the current
debate on same-sex marriage function within cultural and political
rhetoric that serves to delimit further who can access state-recognized
marriage and the benefits that come with it, read by Brandzel as full
citizenship.6 The refinement of what marriage means broadens the gap of
accessing marriage for bodies that do not fit within current nationalist
politics and who are not properly raced or middle or upper class. The
effects of marriage as an institution coupled with post-9/n politics further
produces liminal and racialized bodies that are increasingly 'other' in that
they are non-white, of the poor and working classes, and definitely not
part of the national fabric of the US.
While both queer theory and the current gay rights movement
examine what same-sex marriage means/will mean for the LGBT
community, it is important to examine what liminal bodies can tell us
about marriage and the current political landscape of surveillance and
racialization. Looking at the current literature, I examine how both queer
theorists and the contemporary gay rights movement have situated the
current debate surrounding gay relationships and same-sex marriage. This
examination highlights a gap in the research that can be filled by looking
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Wor~ng from he~ theory ofyS sexual exceptionalism- one that sets up
~encans as haVIng a supenor (read restrained) sexuality in comparison
With the undoubtedly Muslim terrorist 'other'-she argues that Lawrence
allows the US to accept a domesticated type of homosexuality that paints

the US as sexually diverse, while simultaneously creating space for the
homophobic rhetorical description of terrorist sexuality as unrestrained
and always already verging on the psychotic. According to Puar, the
decision presented in Lawrence and the current push for same-sex
marriage work in collusion with nationalist anti-Muslim rhetoric that
maintains the sexual superiority of the US while appearing legalistically
free of race.
Puar not only mentions those bodies/relationships/races/religions
that are scrutinized and ostracized by national sexual exceptionalism
presented in Lawrence, but actually analyzes the effects of the decision in
concert with the current political, national and global landscape, noting
that it is both regulatory and productive of bodies. 8 Moreover, she
critiques the ascendency of whiteness that other critics of Lawrence leave
unexamined. Puar looks at bodies that occupy a space of crossing, whether
it be of race, gender, sex, sexuality, nationality, religion or geography. Her
examination of bodies of crossing produces a more nuanced reading of the
racial and class effects of Lawrence and the desire for same-sex marriage,
while not forgetting the other already domestic bodies of crossing.
Applying a lens that considers both race/ethnicity and class to Lawrence
and the current debate surrounding same-sex marriage removes the
argument from an either/or framework without committing the modernist
move of returning to an idealized and romanticized notion of queer
politics.
In No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive, Lee Edelman
examines queerness and its rejection in terms of a nationalistic claim on
the future. Edelman argues that, because homosexuals and queers have
been painted as a disease unto death that has no (re)productive future,
queers should embrace the identity they have been given in an effort to
end the ceaseless and repetitious claims on futurity by the heterosexist
nation-state. For Edelman, it is the notion of the future that is a regulatory
practice, one that calls bodies to heterosexuality and monogamy while
serving to render queer bodies as anti-nationalist. Edelman believes that
we are compelled to heterosexuality because we as a nation place so much
emphasis on the future and the reproduction of our people and culture.
While Edelman's work seems unrelated to the issue at hand, one
could say that the nation-state's wish to claim reproductive futurity ended
with the Lawrence decision. Albeit limited, Lawrence indicates that the
state is willing to recognize same-sex relations, although the extent to
which those relationships are recognized and the effects of that recognition
are subject to debate. On the other hand, one could read Lawrence and the
push for same-sex marriage as a way in which to incorporate gays and
lesbians into the regulatory and endlessly repetitious notion of the future.
Marriage is bound up with institutions that prefigure a future: property
rights, rights of inheritance, children and their rights. Allowing same-sex
couples to marry would grant them access to a state-propagated future. It
is this latter reading of Edelman that, in conjunction with Puar, highlights
how Lawrence functions within a regulatory nation-state whose politics
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at how liminal bodies function within the marriage debates in a post-9/ll
political setting. This kind of examination frees the debate of the either/or
dich~tomy while providing a more nuanced reading of the current
marnage debate. And while the social positioning of liminal bodies is
marginalized, ~e embrace of that position and the ways in which people
ch~ose to naVIgate ~e regulatory system through differing modes of
resIstance could proVIde those bodies/relationships, which seemingly have
no future, with a liberatory destiny that bridges the gap of queer theory
and the mainstream gay and lesbian culture.
In what follows, I trace the historical past of the gay liberation
movement up to the 2003 Lawrence decision and the critiques of the case.
While the decriminalization of sodomy laws should be celebrated, we
should pay attention to the decision's phraseology and the function of the
d~c~sion as a regulation and surveillance tool of the state. I expand this
cnt.tque of Lawre!1ce by placing it in the context of a post-9/ll regulatory
regime that functions not only to marginalize bodies on the basis of race
class, and nationality, but that is also productive of both deviant and
l~~nal bo~es ~nd relationships. In the final section, I use the concept of
hmmal bodIes In the hopes of blending both the queer critique and the
push for same-sex marriage. This particular queer reading of politics
ackn?w.le.dges the. queer past and looks to the future, embracing a
multiphcIty of family structures that includes marriage, while questioning
the role of the state in regulating bodies via sexuality.
RIGHTS OF THE CITIZEN: QUEERING (OR STRAIGHTENING)
THE NATIONAL BODY

.The events of September 11, 2001 set in motion nationalistic
rhetonc that was not only overtly racist, but which also had sexual
u~d~rtones (and perhaps overtones), within which Lawrence plays a
dIstinct chord. Puar believes that,
Considering the contemporaneous consolidation of
~ew . ra~ial populations, a racialization of religion,
Imphcating Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians and
~hose mistaken for them ("terrorist look-alikes"), the
Impact of Lawrence-Garner must be examined in this
inten~~ly
charged racial atmosphere, which
repetitively defines the slippery contours of racial
markings not only in relation to a dominant white
American formation, but also among people of color
themselves. 7
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create properly nationalist and deviant bodies. Further, the political
lan~scape in which Lawrence and same-sex marriage function produces
bodies that are not clearly defined, that can slip in and out of categories.
QUEER VESTIGES: LOOKING BACK IN TIME
Gay politics today is one of domestication. Everywhere one looks,
gays and lesbians are seemingly visible in the media and on the street.
Depending on location, it is not uncommon to see two men holding hands
or kissing, or to hear of a union ceremony between two people of the same
sex. Gay characters are present on nearly every primetime television
network: Desperate Housewives, Ugly Betty, Will & Grace, Family Guy,
South Park, and Grey's Anatomy. The list goes on and on. Showtime
Networks has even more gay and lesbian exposure with the recently ended
Queer as Folk and The L Word, and has continued with Nurse Jackie.
Although 0e presentation of gay and lesbian (and sometimes bi or trans)
characters IS a welcome addition to television dramas, gay and lesbian
characters are invariably relegated to either a stereotypical performance of
gayness, or are nicely domesticated and rarely deviate from the norms and
lives of their straight counterparts.
The domestication we see of gay narratives reflected in the media is
part and parcel of a much larger project of domestication and nationalism.
In order for a group to be domesticated, the state must define it as a
cate~ory through state institutions of power. Institutions serve to regulate
bodies and groups through the production and maintenance hierarchical
social positioning. Numerous historians have examined how the
"homosexual" as an identity category came into being,9 most starting with
Foucault, who stated,
As defined by the ancient civil or canonical codes

sodomy was a category of forbidden acts; thei;
perpetrator was nothing more than the juridical
subject of them. The nineteenth-century homosexual
became a personage, a past, a case history and a
childhood, in addition to being a type of lif~, a life
form, and a morphology... Nothing that went into his
total
composition was
unaffected by his
sexualit;Y...The sodomite had been a temporary
aberratIOn; the homosexual was now a species. 10

Lawrence v. Texas exemplifies both the function of power to render
bodies and subjects as intelligible and how bodies and subjects are
compelled to fit within existing categories. First and foremost, the notion
that same-sex acts- defined as sodomy in Lawrence-should be legal does
not necessarily constitute a category of (gay) people called into legal being.
But it does show the desire to have certain sexual acts between two
consenting adults recognized as legal under the Constitution. Further, the
language of the decision provides room for same-sex sex acts in private
and is further supported, as we will see in Katherine Franke's reading of
the decision, by a language that alludes to same-sex sex acts occurring in
the form of a couple.II The desire for legality of same-sex sex acts and the
language of the decision alludes to gays and lesbians being compelled by
the state to seek a state-authorized relationship, just like that of straight
people.
Secondly, Lawrence and the current push for same-sex marriage
show just how the state functions to further define and refine social
categories of bodies. The queer and legal literature presented here
expresses anxiety about Lawrence because of its defining characteristics,
which arguably and ironically give the state more control over same-sex
relationships. What started with Lawrence and continues with gay
marriage is the state creating, defining, and controlling same-sex
relationships. The definition of same-sex relations, closely demarcated by
the state, serves to regulate what bodies qualify for marriage, and thereby
some bodies and relationships have either very limited access or no access
to the state-propagated relationship.
While parts of the gay and lesbian movement celebrated Lawrence
as a landmark case for civil rights, the queer faction decried the decision
and was left wondering how marriage-an institution heavily critiqued
during gay liberation-suddenly became the focus of most of the national
gay and lesbian organizations. Many queer activists and academics
believed that the sudden push for same-sex marriage was indicative of a
sort of cultural amnesia that left the projects of gay liberation behind.12
Further, many queer activists and academics view the Lawrence decision
and the push for same-sex marriage as further state intrusion into
personal relationships and increased regulation of sex and sexuality.
HISTORY OF QUEER MOVEMENT

~ou~a~t highl~ghts ~ocial, medical, religious, and psychological
ms~tuti~ns a~d IdeolOgIes that, by ~orking together, produce categories of
bodI~s-m thIS exa~ple the deVIant body- while also simultaneously
defin~ng normal bodIes. The production of categories allows institutions to
exerCIse P?wer. 0.ver bodies by making bodies easily manageable and
cul~ally mtelhgIble, as well as by compelling subjects to bend their
bodIes and bodily experience into a defined category.

The 1950S and 1960s homophile movement experienced many of
the same issues that the current gay and lesbian civil rights movement is
experiencing. The question of how gay people fit into the fabric of the
American public plagued the homophile movement, causing serious
f(r)actioning among the movement's leaders and of the gay and lesbian
community. Some- like the Daughters of Bilitis and the later incarnation
of the Mattachine society led by Ken Burns-wished to operate on terms of
"respectability" in an effort to show straights that gays were no different,
except in their choice of partner. Others wished to take a separatist
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ap~roach, pOi?ting out that gays and lesbians were not at all like straight

society and did. not wish to be assimilated into an already white, middle
class, heteroseXlst and heteronormative culture.
~eeing a g:owing movement on the rise in 1969, Carl Wittman
wro~e his gay manl~esto. ~e examines and disavows many of the tenants of
straight s?~lety while call1~g. out those who wish to seek a politics of gay
re~pectabih~ .through ImJ~ucry of straight society. Quite specifically,
WIttman cnticIzes gay marnage:
:rra?iti~nal

marriage is a rotten, oppressive
mstitution. Those of us who have been in heterosexual
marriages too often have blamed our gayness on the
bre~up o~ the marriage. No. They broke up because
mamage IS a contract which smothers people ... Gay
people must stop gauging their self respect by how
well they mimic straight marriages. Gay marriage will
have the same problems as straight ones except in
bu~lesque. For. the usual legitimacy and pressure
whic~ keep straIght marriages together are absent,
e.g. kids, what parents think, what neighbors say.13
Wi~an ~ls on gays and lesbians to stop comparing their lifestyle and
relationships to those of heterosexual people. Rather, Wittman would
prefer to see the gay and lesbian community form its own set of ideas
'
produced from .the questioning and critique of straight society.
E,:en With .such a radical approach to politics, identity, and
commuIl:Ity form~tion.a~ ~ut fo.rth by Wittman in 1969, larger and deeper
ass~mptions ar~ Imph~It m WIttman's critique of straight society. While
calhng .out straIg?t SOCIety for the propagation of heteronormativity and
what IS es~entially a broken system, neither Wittman nor his
~ontemp"ora~es w~re ready to challenge the meaning of the categories of
woman or man, nor ~ere they yet willing to look at sex/gender/desire
as connected, s~lf-producmg, and endlessly repetitious. Further, Wittman
does not questio~ race, c~as~, or nationalist issues within his piece. He
chalks up the Il:oti~n of mImICry to the desire to emulate straight society,
ra~er t?ll:n VIeWing heternormativity as working in collusion with
nati?nalIStic and regulatory ideology of the state. In an Althusarian way
stra~ghts are called to function as straights just as much as gays and
les~)}~ns are compelled to mimic them. In the late 1980s and early 1990S
aCtiVI~ts and a~demics bega~ to develop Queer Theory that sought t~
questio~ l~rge: SItes of regula~on and oppression by opening up discourse
to . m';lltiphc~tive, and sometimes contradictory or contentious, ways of
thmking, bemg, and presenting.
.. With th: advent of Queer Theory came the unraveling of identity
p~htics. Theonsts like Jud~th Butler,14 Eve Sedgwick,15 Lee Edelman, and
MIc~ael War~er ha.ve questi.oned the emphasis on identity politics and the
mynad ways m whIch Identity as a mode of rights-seeking is problematic.
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Specifically, identity politics works within the very institutional and
normative regulating structures which function to parse out bodies
through the use of identity markers, such as man/woman, gay/straight or
Black/white. Those who do not neatly fit into existing identity categories
are pushed to the margins of society. Moreover, queer theorists look at
how institutions and social structures tend to endlessly reproduce bodies,
narratives and inequality while continuing to reify their own authority. For
Queer Theory, state recognition of relationship status and marriage are
both suspect because of the rights and privileges conferred on individuals
by the state. With the rise in advocacy following the Baehr v. Lewin
decision in Hawaii and Lawrence, queer activists and theorists have been
calling for the deconstruction of same-sex relationship recognition given
by the Lawrence decision. Because Lawrence recognizes intimate samesex acts that "[do] not exceed the honor of the domesticated private,"16
same-sex marriage activists argue that the next logical step in gay and
lesbian civil rights is same-sex marriage, while queer theorists believe
state-sanctioned and regulated same-sex marriage would place gays and
lesbians and under further scrutiny and surveillance.
"OUR BROWN": LAWRENCE v TEXAS, HISTORY, CONTEXT,
AND CRITIQUE ..• BUT NOT OF RACE

The Lawrence v. Texas decision was handed down in June of 2003,
and overturned Bowers v. Hardwick from 1986. This decision, making
criminalization of sodomy unconstitutional, was championed by national
gay and lesbian organizations as a landmark decision, one group going so
far as to call Lawrence "our Brown."17 Yet obviously not everyone, and
certainly not all gays and lesbians, were pleased with the decision, its
arguments, and its possible implications as a method of regulation of
queer bodies and relationships. Within a year, more than a handful of law
scholars, activists, and academics challenged the good intentions of
Lawrence and interrogated what it may mean for the future of gay rightsand they were not alone in their uneasy and mixed feelings about the
Lawrence decision. The same year Lawrence was handed down was also
the year that several states had ballot initiatives to amend their respective
constitutions to define marriage as between one man and one woman. It
was also the same year that Massachusetts legalized same-sex marriage,
using Lawrence as a small part of the majority's reasoning (although the
Massachusetts court has a history of making decisions in favor of gay and
lesbian families). The court decisions and numerous ballot initiatives,
happening just months apart, indicate an anxiety about gays and lesbians,
and how recognition of their relationships fit into the national fabric.
National gay and lesbian organizations hoped that Lawrence would be the
gateway decision to same-sex marriage, while lawmakers and the public at
large were thrown into a pro/con debate on marriage. While some
lawmakers may have been supportive of gay rights, many did not want
their constituents to believe they were attacking traditional marriage.
32
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Writing in The Michiga"n Law Review, Nan Hunter states, "In
Lawrence .v. T~as, 0e Supreme Court performed a double move, creating
a dramatic discurSIve moment: it both decriminalized consensual
homosexual relations between adults, and, simultaneously authorized a
new regime of heightened regulation of homosexuality."19 For some the
Lawrence decision meant the decriminalization of homosexual acts,' and
therefore t~e state would b.e less involved in the prosecution of private
sexual relations. Hunter belIeves that the Lawrence decision framed in a
mix~d language of privatized. liberty, gives the state the right to
continuously hear homosexualIty spoken and examined, placing the
homosexual body and same-sex sex acts under further and more injurious
examination and regulation.
H~ter finds . that, because of Lawrence, "the state .. . will be more,
not less, m~olved WIth the regulation of homosexuality."20 The paradox of
Lawrence IS that the decision clearly indicates that the state should have
nothing to d.o with what consenting adults do behind closed doors, yet the
actual fun.ction of Lawrence ends up placing gays and lesbians in closer
contact WIth the st~te and functions as a regulatory apparatus. Hunter
equates the regulation of homosexuals with containment: how can the
state a~ow hom?sexuality to exist while keeping it apart from, and thereby
~ro~~cting, straIght culture? Through the regulation of relationships, the
lImIting of culture, .and the instillation of a hierarchy within the
homos~xual commumty, gays and lesbians will be compelled into a
do.~esticated ~nd regulated for~ ~f sexuality with affixed state rights and
pnvIleges, ~~Ile furth~r . ostracIzmg non-monogamous and differently
formed famIlIes. The lImIted display and space of gay culture and the

hierarchy within the gay community gives gays and lesbians the incentive
to buy into the state propagated form of same-sex marriage. Lawrence
functions with other state institutions to domesticate queer bodies and
relationships.
Ironically, while Hunter argues that Lawrence puts gays and
lesbians in closer contact with the government, she does not acknowledge
those racialized and classed queer bodies that are already under the close
surveillance of the state, and therefore have varying degrees of access to
privacy.21 For raced and classed queer bodies, the divide of public and
private spheres, which Hunter assumes to be separate, becomes a slippery
boundary that is not only examined and further refined by state
institutions, but also by the bodies occupying that space. Depending on
social positioning, raced and classed queer bodies slip in and out of both
spheres, creating a liminal raced and classed queer body. Hunter's
containment theory sounds strikingly like Jim Crow laws of the early
twentieth century, which were often undermined by bodies of passing. I do
not mean to say that gays and lesbians are blatantly (and legally) separated
from the dominant heterocentric culture, but I do mean to point out that
her theory has a specifically racialized past. Containment, or the sectioning
off of privileges and rights of a minority group under the guise of equality,
is at work both in segregation laws of the past and post-9/11 politics of
surveillance. Hunter is right to point out that Lawrence and same-sex
marriage would put queer bodies in closer contact with regulatory
government institutions, yet she does not account for the racialized
implications of her theory, which not only serve to define and promote a
domesticated and white queerness, but also to further regulate queers of
color.
Looking at how Lawrence functions within both the public and
private sphere will help illustrate the racialized implications of Hunter's
containment theory, and how liminal bodies are produced. Katherine
Franke, writing in the Columbia Law Review, believes that "the liberty
principle upon which the [Lawrence] opinion rests is less expansive,
rather geographized, and, in the end, domesticated. It is not the synonym
of a robust liberal concept of freedom."22 Because the Lawrence decision
states that the government should have nothing to do with what two
consenting adults do behind closed doors, Lawrence puts forth a notion of
liberty that is bound up in the domesticated private sphere. Noting that
Lawrence articulates privacy as framed in terms of liberty, Franke looks to
other nations and their rulings on sodomy laws to show the limited and
privatized liberty exhibited in Lawrence. She notes that South Africans'
arguments against sodomy laws are grounded in a politics of equal rights
that is overtly centered in the public sphere. South African Justice
Ackermann, Franke notes, posits a hypothetical in which several couples,
both gay and straight, are kissing passionately in public. Ackermann notes
that, while a straight and lesbian couple could kiss as such in public, the
male same-sex couple would be guilty of a criminal offense. "What is
remarkable," Franke argues, "is the degree to which [the hypothetical's]
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. By looking at the writings of law scholars and queer theorists, I
examme the debate about Lawrence and the implications the decision has
for 0e current campaign for same-sex marriage. While both queer
theonsts and law scholars believe that Lawrence reifies a limited type of
gay relationship, they worry about how the decision and same-sex
marriage could further allow the state to regulate sexual relations and
relationships, placing the homosexual body and other "deviant" bodies
under further scrutiny. In this sense, Lawrence and gay marriage have
been read as part of a "domesticating" project, which seeks to push the
homosexual body into a "proper" form of existence (read monogamous,
safe, long-term, stable) that closely resembles the straight body. IS Both the
Lawrence decision and the push for same-sex marriage fit within a post9/11 politics of surveillance, regulation, and interrogation of improperly
raced, classed, sexed, and sexualized bodies and relationships' this serves
to discipline deviant bodies, while also unintentionally produ~ing liminal
bodies that occupy the line between the mainstream and the deviant as the
private and public spheres further converge.
QUEER LEGAL DISSENTS: THE POLITICS
PRIVATE AND SURVEILLANCE

OF PUBLICI
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absurdity does not depend on a conception of privacy...It is the disparate
legal treatment of similarly situated kissers that strikes Justice Ackermann
as absurd and unfair, not the location in which the same-sex kissing takes
place."23
Because the Lawrence decision is rendered in terms of a privatized
liberty, Franke believes that "[Justice] Kennedy's privatized liberty leaves
a wide range of homosexual and heterosexual behaviors and 'lifestyles'
subject to criminalization."24 Franke worries that both the possibilities
opened up and foreclosed by the Lawrence decision create a
"domestinormative" notion of subjectivity that is relegated by the state to
the private. Lawrence does little to find new ways of expressing sexuality
both publicly and privately, that are counter to the heteronorm. Frank~
wi~hes to remind us that rights gained does not necessarily mean liberty
gamed: "!Vhy sh~uld we take it as a priori true that the expansion of rights
necessarily promises greater freedom? What do we risk when our political
agenda sets a horizon that has no greater depth of field than securing legal
rights and recognition by the state?"25
While Franke interrogates the domesticating effects of Lawrence
and questions
. the notion that "more rights equal more freedom"' she does
n?t q~estion to whom the.se rights and freedoms are supposedly given.
Situating her argument m a Post-9/n politics elucidates just how
Lawrence functions to regulate sex and sexuality in specifically raced and
classed terms. Because Lawrence functions within a Post-9/n politics of
surveill?Dc~ and regulation and is framed as a privatized liberty with
domesticati~g effects, Lawrence renders raced and classed bodies, already
under surveillance through interactions with state institutions such as
state medical clinics and state housing, subject to further scrutiny, and
ther:fore forc~s them to occupy a liminal space that is neither entirely
pubhc nor pnvate. Franke, like Hunter, points out the domesticating
effects of Lawrence, but does not call attention to the bodies
relationships, and sexualities-as they intersect with race and class- that
~re .further ~arginli1:ized through the state recognition of rights within the
hmlted pUrvIew of hberty. First, Franke does not examine the issue from
the standpoint of those bodies/relationships, but merely calls attention to
the effects of the law to support her claim of the "domestinormative"
functi~ns of Lawre.nce. and. its. further extension into marriage. Further,
she ~lsses the. racial Imph~~tlOns of a domesticated liberty that, while
seemmgly apphcable to all citizens as worded in Lawrence is difficult for
~aced and classed queer bodies to achieve because of their liminal position
m between the public/private divide. Secondly, Franke returns the debate
to the either/or frame",:o.rk of "are you for or against same-sex marriage?"
becaus: of her he~vy cntique ~f Lawr.ence and same-sex marriage. Simply,
she ~ehev~s that If q~eer subJ:cts WIsh to avoid state regulation of their
rela~o~shlp. and family formations, they should question the methods of
obtal~mg nghts and p.ri~~ges e~emplified in Lawrence. Apparently
m~m.age and personal/mdlVldual hberty cannot coexist. And lastly, in
pomting out how the Lawrence decision mixes liberty and privacy, Franke
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covers over the potential radical nature of the court purposefully showing
a connection between the public and private spheres (as it is for raced and
classed queer bodies), rather than the spheres existing as clearly
demarcated and discrete.
Both Hunter and Franke focus on Justice Kennedy's majority
opinion while passingly mentioning the dissent of Justice Scalia. Bernard
Harcourt takes up this issue and tries to fabulously reconstruct Scalia's
dissent as "post-queer." Justice Scalia, the conservative anchor of the
court, calls attention to several issues while writing for the minority: the
ongoing "culture wars," the court's decision to take a side in those wars,
the law profession that tends to function in a liberal-leaning ideology, and
the supposed "homosexual agenda" at work in our nation. What Harcourt
finds interesting is that, if framed differently, Justice Scalia's arguments
against Lawrence could be read as radical, perhaps more so than Justice
Kennedy's majority opinion.
Scalia calls out the non-neutral position of the majority in
Lawrence, stating that the court has taken a side in the culture wars.
Further, Scalia is amazed that the court would not heed standare dicisis
by overturning Bowers so quickly and with such radical language.
Harcourt rightly argues that no decision by the Court, no matter how well
argued, is ever clearly free of bias, and that it continues to operate within
dominant cultural and social ideologies. Scalia is right when he says that
the court has taken a side in the culture wars; there was simply no way
around it. Moreover, he is right in pointing out that the seemingly liberal
law profession functions within ideologies that led to the Lawrence
decision, but Harcourt further points out that Scalia himself is a product of
a larger set of interlocking institutions and cannot help but be influenced
by ideology. Lastly, Harcourt believes that
it is critical to dispense with the notion of a
'homosexual agenda' and to explore, instead, the
proliferation of sexual projects in contemporary
society, to examine the surprising alliances that form
on sex matters, and to reconsider all the different
interests at stake. This may lead us, in the process, to
revisit exactly who won and who lost in Lawrence. 26
By reworking Scalia's dissent in this fashion, Harcourt argues, we can see
the post-queer critiques of the powers of the state and the legitimizing
institutions behind the judicial system, as well as the social regulations
imposed on queer bodies.
What is left out here- as in all of the above critiques of Lawrenceare the issues of race, class, and nationality. For these authors, it is
assumed that, given the wording of Lawrence, all bodies that are citizens
and are properly raced and classed have access to the liberties granted by
the decision. To put it simply: every subject is the same before the law. Yet
as the reading of Hunter and Franke above demonstrates, raced and
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classed bodies occupy a liminal space, and therefore have limited access to
the liberties that the Lawrence decision grants. Surprisingly, Harcourt
doe~ not call attention to the post-9/ll ideologies of surveillance, of which
ScalIa and the rest of the court are also part. By leaving issue of race and
class untouched, Harcourt misses an opportunity to examine the true
implications of a refashioned-and what he terms "post-queer"-reading of
Scalia's dissent. Rather, Harcourt's wheels are spinning in the quagmire of
queerness that is based out of a limited, one strike view of oppression and
marginality, namely that of sexual identity. Being post-queer, through the
deconstruction of Scalia's identity, without an in-depth analysis of race
and class (not to mention sex and gender) is simply insufficient at
rendering an accurate picture of the regulatory regimes at work in the
production and decision of Lawrence v. Texas.
WRAPPED INTO MARRIAGE AND BORDERS: FURTHER
EXTENSIONS OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS

From the standpoint of the national gay and lesbian organizations,
once Lawrence became the law of the land and gay relationships protected
un~er the Con~titution, the next logical step was a state-by-state or
national campaIgn for same-sex marriage: "But the political agenda
l:,:eraged by that recognition [of gays and lesbians as rights-bearing
~Itizens] ~oes not exceed honor of the domesticated private. The most
likely project .to b,~ launched from this conception of subjectivity is, of
course, marnage. 27 Franke argues that the language of Lawrence
relegates homosexual relations to the private sphere. Once the right-topriva~ ~ubjectivity is achiev~d, the next step would be to fight for public
recognItion of same-sex relationships-gay marriage.
. Whil~ same-sex marriage seems to be a ubiquitous issue todayespeCIally WIth the Proposition 8 trials in California- the public at large
rarely gets.to hear queer voices that are against same-sex marriage. Queers
who question the value of same-sex, government-recognized marriage are
often drowned out by the national campaigns and the media hype
surrounding the issue. Further, because of the benefits afforded to married
couples and the "obvious .ubiq~ity" of the issue for the gay community, it
seems cr~ that ~nr self-Identified gay or lesbian would speak out against
gay mamage. It IS Important to examine the arguments of anti-marriage
queers for a few reasons: 1) their arguments provide a voice that is not
usually hear~ o? a. na?onal s~ale, 2) their arguments further implicate
sta~e and.soclal m~titutlOns as SItes of oppression, and 3) they also provide
a discurSIve look mto how race and class can sometimes be forgotten in
what has become a more "mainstream" queer movement.
. Michael Wa~er exemplifies a queer perspective on same-sex
marnage. 28 He exammes the problems with gay marriage on two fronts:
first, how La.wrence gets .wrapped up in the debate and, secondly, how the
gay a?d lesbIan. commumty has been wrapped into the desire for same-sex
marnage, despIte the costs to both gay and lesbian history and to other
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queer bodies and relationships. Given the history of the gay and lesbian
movement,29 he argues, it is striking that the contemporary movement is
so willing to forget their past and ask to be regulated by an institution that
was so heavily questioned in the 1960s, '70S, and '80S:
Others argue, either ingenuously or disingenuously,
that marriage has nothing to do with these historical
commitments, that it is not a question of social change
or cultural politics at all but a neutral matter on which
each individual must decide. This is the official or
semiofficial position of the major national gay and
lesbian organizations: the National Gay and Lesbian
Task Force, the Human Rights Campaign, and
Lambda Legal Defense. Either way, the crucial
founding insights behind several decades' worth of
gay and lesbian politics are now being forgotten. If the
campaign for marriage requires such a massive
repudiation of queer culture's best insights on
intimate relations, sex, and the politics of stigma, then
the campaign is doing more harm than marriage
could ever be worth.30
For Warner, the issue of marriage is not an individual question that is
outside queer history. Rather, Warner works at length to call attention to
queer history and its critique, focused on marriage as part of a larger
system of regulation. The queer past's repudiation of marriage was only
one part of a much larger critique of social systems. For queers of the past,
questioning and challenging marriage was a way in which queers could
fight for social change on a much larger scale. Yet the current
configuration of marriage politics for the larger social/activist
organizations requires, according to Warner, an erasure of the past, a
forgetting of "queer culture's best insights on intimate relations, sex, and
the politics of stigma."3 1 Erasure of the past allows for marriage advocates
to point to ways in which marriage will "benefit" the queer community.
Warner takes up several of the various arguments for same-sex marriagethe domestication of "obviously promiscuous" men, recognition of love,
the social and economic incentives of the government, and social stigma
and shame- and deconstructs them to highlight how each still plays into a
hierarchy of valued relationships, placing married couples higher up on
the chain, while devaluing single people, alternate families, and long-term
unmarried partners.
illtimately, Warner argues that privileges that are conferred on
married couples should be given to all citizens, regardless of marital
status. At the same time, he questions the social value we place on
coupling and state recognition of relationships, the shame and social
stigma placed on gay relationships, and how culture compels gays and
lesbians to desire marriage. Calling attention to the arbitrary link between
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marriage and benefits, Warner writes, "Most of the benefits could be
extended to other kinds of households and intimate relations. Very few
have a necessary relation to a couple or intimate pair- perhaps, logically
en?ug~, only those ~avin~ to do with divorce. All others could be thought
of m ?ifferent ways. 32 This approach to marriage, or rather the removal of
mar!,age ~om other economic and social benefits, fits in with the queer
past s desIre to challenge larger social norms in order to fight for social
change.
While this approach would remove the economic pressures from
couples t? marry, it does not account for the symbolic nature of marriage,
nor ~oes It acco~mt ~or those who are aware of the marginalizing effects of
mamage. but still WIsh to have their relationship recognized by both the
co.~mumty and ~e state. How do these queers fit in? How, given Warner's
cntique of marnage, could queer subjects reconcile an attachment to the
queer movements of the past while still fulfilling their desire to marry?
Further, what about ethnic or racial minorities? It seems that Warner
envisions the queer community as unilaterally similar in both race and
class, and as if neither social category were worrisome. Warner leaves
questions like 0ese une.xamined because they do not fit within the strong
and unapologe~c commItme~t to larger social change of queer ideology.
. Eve.n w~ile W~rner trie~ to accommodate more queer bodies and
relati.onshI~s mto hIS re?gunng of the debate surrounding same-sex
marnage, his argument still comes up short, because he does not examine
the contemporary so~ial an~ po!itical contexts within which the marriage
debate operates. Agam, he hIghlIghts those queer bodies and relationships
that .are ~ushed to ~he outer. margins of society by state recognition of
relationshIps-especIally marrIage-but does not examine the debate from
the ~tandpoint of those liminal bodies/relationships that are not
sufficIently qu~~r, nor does he acknowledge the workings of Post-9/n
regul~tory pohtics on raced and classed bodies. Warner's critique of
marn~ge serves to produce yet another type of docile body, one that is
sufficIently (;Il~eer to not desire marriage, or is not duped by the desire of
state recognItion of any form of relationship which can be read as another
type of, queer liminal body-the docile and insufficiently queer body.
~a~er s call to the queer .past ends up refiguring an already wide divide
WIthm the q';leer .co~mumty. Qu.eers who desire marriage, despite being
aware ~f the I!ll~hcations o~ marnage, are rendered as insufficiently queer,
occupymg a hmmal sp.ace m the queer community, and therefore subject
to shame. ~~ments h~e Warner's call queer bodies to self-regulate into a
st~te th~t IS COIT~ctly' queer, a subject that heeds the queer past and
alIgns his/her deSIres to. the g.oals of that past. Warner's argument does
anot~er double turn: whIle trying to lessen (if not end) hierarchical social
r~l~~ons, he ends up rearticulating a rhetoric that has implications of
diVISIon and.shame, still leaving some queers to fall through the cracks of
personal deSIre, duty to the (queer) community, and state regulation.
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LIMINAL BODIES: A PRODUCfIVE USE OF MODERNTIY AND
THE FUTURISTIC POLITICS OF THE HERE-AND-NOW?

Indeed, any viable rendering of contemporary
biopolitics must address more specifically how
biopower attempts not just to produce and control life
in general ... but also to privilege some lives over
others.33
Looking at the queer responses to Lawrence and the push for samesex marriage, we can see that queer theorists and activists also frame the
debate in either/or tenns, exchanging one fonn of scrutiny for another.
The implication is that if subjects are not sufficiently queer, they too are
rendered suspect, and are therefore in need of interrogation, examination,
and-in an extreme sense-radical violence to (re)produce those subjects
as queer.
How can we piece together both the queer arguments while
allowing space for those that embrace Lawrence and the national
campaign for same-sex marriage? What other ways of examining the
debate allow us to find new paths to bridging this gap? It is ironic that
both sides acknowledge the limiting of bodies and relationships produced
through Lawrence and same-sex marriage, yet neither examines the
debate from a standpoint of raced and classed queer liminality. The
modernist time claims of queer theorists are not useful because, given the
current progression of the political landscape, it is not possible to reclaim
that kind of activism without accounting for the mainstreaming of gay and
lesbian culture. Further, the mainstream can no longer ignore queer
critiques of governmental regulation and the interrogation of bodies and
relations. Because both sides point to the production of bodies that exist
outside of the either/or framing of the debates, should we not start our
examination of the issue from these bodies/relations that toe the line
between queer and mainstream?
Liminal bodies are those bodies that slip in and out of spaces, but
are not fully acknowledged in either space. Further, because liminal bodies
actualize slippage between categories, they highlight the ability to get
beyond the either/or framing of the debate, while showing cracks in
institutional frameworks-cracks that are potential sites of resistance.
Examining bodies that occupy the raced and class liminal space between
the queer and the mainstream will further open up the debate, allowing
scholars and activists to account for those who are forced to the margins
by both sides in the dichotomous debate.
For example, consider a man or woman who is married and has a
child, but openly admits his/her attraction to the same sex and openly
discusses his/her feelings with his/her partner. Or consider the black
lesbian couple who is unmarried and has a child, the father of whom
provides support and care. Or the widower who has a child, and now finds
himself attracted to men. Or the transgendered FI'M who wants to marry
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his partner, but cannot because doing so would disqualify him from
receiving federal benefits such as food stamps. Or consider the lesbian
couple and the gay couple who live together and have a child between the
four of them. How do these relationships and their 'non-normative' family
structures fit within both the queer and mainstream recognition and
marriage debate?
Currently, they do not.34 Both queer and mainstream arguments
call attention to these liminal bodies and relationships without examining
them. The first couple would appear 'normal' in some circles, while being
read as queer in others-but it would really never fit neatly into either. The
black lesbian couple could get married in some states, but how does that
recognize the father of their child, who is deeply connected to them? The
widower would pass in one society, and be looked at with suspicion in the
other, while once again not really feeling at home in either. The FfM and
his partner are left with an economic choice: food and affordable bills with
assistance, or relationship recognition. The gay and lesbian couples could
marry their partners, but that would not in any way acknowledge their
status as a family.
And these are but a few of the issues with the liminal bodies
produced by Lawrence and same-sex marriage. An interrogation of the
domestic implications of the regulatory, domesticating, and productive
functions of Lawrence and the mainstream push for same-sex marriage
needs to be conducted through the lens of raced and classed liminal
bodies, bodies that are not unaffected by the regulatory regime of the
nation-state, that are variously rendered unintelligible or intelligible
depending on context, and that move in and out of spaces of normality and
queerness. This analysis will further complicate the debate surrounding
Lawrence and same-sex marriage, but will also provide more paths to
questioning the effects of the state and its regulatory practices, showing
that such practices are simultaneously oppressive and sites of resistance,
while also removing the current debate from the either/or framing that
serves to foreclose alternate options.
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Three Poems by Daniele Pantano

(2002):

In the case of gay marriage or of affiliative legal alliances, we see
how various sexual practices and relationships that fal] outside
the purview of the sanctifying law become illegible or, worse,
untenable, and how new hierarchies emerge within public
discourse. These hierarchies not only enforce the distinction
between legitimate and illegitimate queer lives, but they produce
tacit distinctions among forms of illegitimacy. The stable pair
who would marry if only they could are cast as currently
illegitimate, but eligible for a future legitimacy, whereas the
sexual agents who function outside the purview of the marriage
bond and its recognized, if illegitimate, alternative form now
constitute sexual possibilities that will never be eligible for a
translation into legitimacy. These are possibilities that become
increasingly disregarded within the sphere of politics as a
consequence of the priority that the marriage debate has
assumed. This is an i1Jegtimacy whose temporal condition is to
be foreclosed from any possible future transformation. It is not
only not yet legitimate, but it is, we might say, the irrecoverable
and irreversible past of legitimacy: the never will be, the never
was. (18)
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EASTERNVILLAGE~THFACTORY

Dogs bark in untended fields. Outside, artificial light
Pools the road nobody's died on with men sauntering
The graveyard shift, unafraid to sing alone. I stretch out
And find I married a woman who doesn't care that they
Have picked up the ambrosial bouquet of sex--neatly
Wrapped in tissue paper--at the foot of our bed. She
Welcomes the rabid charge. Anything that reminds her
She belongs to the faint hinterland. She keeps the doors
Unlocked. I say nothing. Men or dogs. There will be no
Other end.
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